Lucas Davis reviews the recent history of the nuclear power industry and finds that, in addition to concerns about nuclear accidents, proliferation risk, and the storage of spent fuel, a key challenge is the high cost of construction of nuclear plants. Construction costs are so high that it is difficult to make an economic argument for nuclear power. Davis finds that this is particularly true in countries like the United States where recent technological advances have dramatically increased the availability of natural gas.

Using two large datasets, the National Survey of Families and Households and the public use files of the U.S. Census, Janice Compton and Robert Pollak find that the predicted probability of employment and labor force participation is between 4 and 10 percentage points higher for married women with young children living in close proximity to their mothers or their mothers-in-law than for those living further away. The researchers interpret family-member availability to include not only regular scheduled childcare during work hours but also whether the mother or mother-in-law can provide irregular or unanticipated childcare as needed in emergencies or other special circumstances.

In a sample of 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008, Alberto Alesina, Dorian Carloni, and Giampaolo Lecce find no evidence that governments that quickly reduce budget deficits are systematically voted out of office. The researchers conclude that it is possible for governments to reduce deficits without subsequent electoral defeat.

In Japan around 1990 and Korea in the early 2000s, cuts in legislated standard hours raised employers’ overtime costs. Using time-diaries from before and after these changes, Jungmin Lee, Daiji Kawaguchi, and Daniel Hamermesh find that per capita hours of market work declined, but the time freed up was spent only on leisure activities and personal maintenance. In other words, the average individual does not appear to increase the time spent on household production in response to a permanent gift of time.

Both deadlines and penalties are used to encourage contractors to complete their government procurement projects in a timely manner. Analyzing data from state highway construction projects in Minnesota -- including day-by-day reports by the project engineers on weather conditions, construction delays, and planned and actual work hours -- Gregory Lewis and Patrick Bajari find that contractors do adapt their work rates when needed in an attempt to meet project deadlines, but not by enough. These researchers estimate that for an average $1.3 million contract, the government's setting a 10 percent tighter construction deadline would increase their measure of "social welfare" by less than $7,000; switching to penalties equal to 10 percent of the traffic-delay cost would raise welfare by almost $40,000 per contract; and the fully efficient policy -- a "lane rental" in which the contractor must pay the full traffic delay cost for each day of construction -- would increase welfare by $400,000 per contract.