The Bidder Exclusion Effect
We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results to empirical work. It applies in a broad range of information settings and auction formats without requiring instruments or estimation of a complex structural model. We demonstrate the approach using US timber and used-car auction data.
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Copy CitationDominic Coey, Bradley Larsen, and Kane Sweeney, "The Bidder Exclusion Effect," NBER Working Paper 20523 (2014), https://doi.org/10.3386/w20523.Download Citation
Published Versions
Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019. "The bidder exclusion effect," The RAND Journal of Economics, vol 50(1), pages 93-120. citation courtesy of 
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