NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Kane Sweeney

Uber, Marketplace Optimization
1455 Market St #400
San Francisco, CA 94103

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Institutional Affiliation: eBay Research Labs

NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2018Price Salience and Product Choice
with Thomas Blake, Sarah Moshary, Steven Tadelis: w25186
We study the effect of price salience on whether a product is purchased and, conditional on purchase, the quality purchased. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that making the full purchase price salient to consumers reduces both the quality and quantity of goods purchased. The effect of salience on quality accounts for at least 28% of the overall revenue decline. Evidence shows that the effects persist beyond the first purchase and impact even experienced users. Detailed click-stream data shows that price-obfuscation makes price comparisons difficult and results in consumers spending more than they otherwise would. We also find that sellers respond to the increased price obfuscation by listing higher quality tickets.
June 2018The Simple Empirics of Optimal Online Auctions
with Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen, Caio Waisman: w24698
We study reserve prices computed to maximize the expected profit of the seller based on historical observations of incomplete bid data typically available to the auction designer in online auctions for advertising or e-commerce. This direct approach to computing reserve prices circumvents the need to fully recover distributions of bidder valuations. We derive asymptotic results and also provide a new bound, based on the empirical Rademacher complexity, for the number of historical auction observations needed in order for revenue under the estimated reserve price to approximate revenue under the optimal reserve arbitrarily closely. This simple approach to estimating reserves may be particularly useful for auction design in Big Data settings, where traditional empirical auctions methods may ...
September 2014The Bidder Exclusion Effect
with Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen: w20523
We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results to empirical work. It applies in a broad range of information settings and auction formats without requiring instruments or estimation of a complex structural model. We demonstrate the approach using US timber and used-car auction data.

Published: Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019. "The bidder exclusion effect," The RAND Journal of Economics, vol 50(1), pages 93-120. citation courtesy of

 
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