@techreport{NBERw8469,
 title = "From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure",
 author = "James E. Anderson and Oriana Bandiera",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "8469",
 year = "2001",
 month = "September",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w8469",
 abstract = {Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers.},
}