London School of Economics
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2017||CEO Behavior and Firm Performance|
with Stephen Hansen, Andrea Prat, Raffaella Sadun: w23248
We measure the behavior of 1,114 CEOs in six countries parsing granular CEO diary data through an unsupervised machine learning algorithm. The algorithm uncovers two distinct behavioral types: “leaders” and “managers”. Leaders focus on multi-function, high-level meetings, while managers focus on one-to-one meetings with core functions. Firms with leader CEOs are on average more productive, and this difference arises only after the CEO is hired. The data is consistent with horizontal differentiation of CEO behavioral types, and firm-CEO matching frictions. We estimate that 17% of sample CEOs are mismatched, and that mismatches are associated with significant productivity losses.
|December 2013||Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work|
with Renata Lemos, Andrea Prat, Raffaella Sadun: w19722
We present evidence on the labor supply of CEOs, and on whether family and professional CEOs differ on this dimension. We do so through a new survey instrument that allows us to codify CEOs’ diaries in a detailed and comparable fashion, and to build a bottom-up measure of CEO labor supply. The comparison of 1,114 family and professional CEOs reveals that family CEOs work 9% fewer hours relative to professional CEOs. Hours worked are positively correlated with firm performance, and differences between family and non-family CEOs account for approximately 18% of the performance gap between family and non-family firms. We investigate the sources of the differences in CEO labor supply across governance types by exploiting firm and industry heterogeneity, and quasi-exogenous meteorological and s...
|January 2011||Matching Firms, Managers and Incentives|
with Andrea Prat, Luigi Guiso, Raffaella Sadun: w16691
We exploit a unique combination of administrative sources and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data includes manager characteristics, such as risk aversion and talent; firm characteristics, such as ownership; detailed measures of managerial practices relative to incentives, dismissals and promotions; and measurable outcomes, for the firm and for the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentive provision generates an array of implications that can be tested with our data. Our contribution is twofold. We disentangle the role of risk-aversion and talent in determining how firms select and motivate managers. In particular, risk-averse managers are matched with firms that offer low-powered contracts. We also show that empirical findings linking governanc...
Bandiera, Oriana, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics (forthcoming). citation courtesy of
|September 2001||From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure|
with James E. Anderson: w8469
Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers.
Published: Anderson, James E. and Oriana Bandiera. “Private Enforcement and Social Efficiency." Journal of Development Economics 77 (2005): 341-366.