@techreport{NBERw8300,
 title = "Affiliation, Integration, and Information: Ownership Incentives and Industry Structure",
 author = "Thomas N. Hubbard",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "8300",
 year = "2001",
 month = "May",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w8300",
 abstract = {This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant-level scale economies are small and market power is not an issue.  At issue is the question: what makes industries necessarily fragmented? The theoretical model distinguishes between the structure of brands and firms in an industry by examining trade-offs associated with affiliation and integration, and how they are affected by the contracting environment.  I show how contractual incompleteness can lead industries to be necessarily fragmented. I also show that improvements in the contracting environment will tend to lead to a greater concentration of brands, but whether they lead industries to be more or less concentrated depends on what becomes contractible.  I then discuss the propositions generated by the model through a series of case study examples.},
}