Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict, and International Tax Coordination

Dani Rodrik, Tanguy van Ypersele

NBER Working Paper No. 7150
Issued in June 1999
NBER Program(s):   IFM   ITI   PE

Basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility. But just as free trade in goods, there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better off. Consequently, capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances.

(200 K)

Published: Rodrik, Dani and Tanguy Van Ypersele. "Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict And International Tax Coordination," Journal of International Economics, 2001, v54(1,Jun), 57-73.

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