tanguy van ypersele
Route des Milles
13290 Les Milles
Institutional Affiliation: University of the Mediterranean, Marseilles
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|June 1999||Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict, and International Tax Coordination|
with Dani Rodrik: w7150
Basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility. But just as free trade in goods, there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better off. Consequently, capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances.
Published: Rodrik, Dani and Tanguy Van Ypersele. "Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict And International Tax Coordination," Journal of International Economics, 2001, v54(1,Jun), 57-73. citation courtesy of
|February 1999||Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights|
with Steven Shavell: w6956
This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights, but a principal difficulty with rewards is the information required for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward systems, and that an optional reward system under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to intellectual property rights.
Published: Shavell, Steven and Tanguy Van Ypersele. "Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, 2001, v44(2,Oct), 525-547. citation courtesy of