NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

NBER Working Paper No. 5556
Issued in May 1996
NBER Program(s):   ME

By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area and suggest several open and unresolved issues. We also examine the empirical evidence drawn from studies on samples of OECD countries, Latin American countries and US states.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5556

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