NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Choosing a Dictator: Bureaucracy and Welfare in Less Developed Polities

James E. Rauch

NBER Working Paper No. 5196
Issued in July 1995
NBER Program(s):   ITI

Recent work in the sociology of economic development has emphasized the establishment of a professional government bureaucracy in place of political appointees as an important component of the institutional environment in which private enterprise can flourish. I focus on the role that internal promotion can play in bringing to power individuals who highly value (relative to income) imposition of their preferences over collective goods on the public. Such individuals restrain the corruption of their subordinates as a byproduct of their efforts to implement their preferences using tax revenue. Within this hierarchical framework I investigate the effects of varying subordinate compensation levels and of recruiting them meritocratically.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5196

Published: "Leadership Selection, Internal Promotion, and Bureaucratic Corruption in Less Developed Polities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 34 (February 2001), pp. 240-258.

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