Insulation of Pensions from Political Risk
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NBER Working Paper No. 4895
Issued in October 1994
NBER Program(s): AG
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There are many sources of political risk to public provision of pensions. This paper analyzes legislation to alter the retirement income system. This approach naturally recognizes that some changes in the system are good responses to social risks, while others generate such risks. Thus the discussion is in terms of the effect of institutional structure on the likelihood of alternative legislative actions. Particular attention is paid to the roles of automatic pension adjustment and pension professionals in providing insulation. Briefly touched upon is the tendency of legislation to redistribute as a function of the type of system being created.
Published: in S. Valdez, editer, The Economics of Pensions: Principles, Policies, and International Experience; Cambridge University Press ; Cambridge, 1997
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