AI as Strategist

Can artificial intelligence (AI) function as an organisational strategist? This paper adapts the formal theory of strategy developed by van den Steen (2017, 2018a) to a two-decision framework in which the strategist may be either human or AI. The model distinguishes two channels through which strategy creates value: an expertise effect, which improves the stand-alone quality of key decisions, and a coordination effect, which aligns interdependent choices through influence or control. We compare human and AI strategists along two primitives— confidence (belief accuracy) and agreement (shared judgment)—and show how these shape the effectiveness of authority and persuasion. Our analysis reveals that credibility substitutes for control: as agreement with the strategist increases, the value of formal authority diminishes. Transparent AIs, which generate higher credibility through architectural selection, can guide effectively through influence, while opaque AIs require formal control to realise their expertise advantage. These findings highlight how AI transparency serves as a substitute for authority, yielding design implications for domain-contingent authority and progressive delegation in human–AI collaboration.