Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing
Among men, the black-white wage gap is as large today as it was in 1950. We test whether the black-white wage gap is due to asymmetric information using newly collected data on occupational licensing laws that ban workers with criminal records. We find evidence supporting this hypothesis. The licensing premiums for black men are largest in licensed occupations that restrict felons —particularly in states with Banthe-Box laws and at small firms. In these contexts where a worker’s criminal history is difficult to infer, we find that occupational licensing reduces asymmetric information and reduces the racial wage gap.
-
-
Copy CitationPeter Q. Blair and Bobby W. Chung, "Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing," NBER Working Paper 24791 (2018), https://doi.org/10.3386/w24791.Download Citation
-
-
Published Versions
Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, 2025. "Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 107(2), pages 338-354.
Related
Topics
Programs
Working Groups
More from the NBER
In addition to working papers, the NBER disseminates affiliates’ latest findings through a range of free periodicals—the NBER Reporter, the NBER Digest, the Bulletin on Health, the Bulletin on the Economics of Alzheimer's, and the Bulletin on Entrepreneurship—as well as research spotlights, lectures, and panel videos.
