Complex Disclosure
We present evidence that unnecessarily complex disclosure can result from strategic incentives to shroud information. In our lab experiment, senders are required to report their private information truthfully, but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find that senders use complex disclosure over half the time. This obfuscation is profitable because receivers make systematic mistakes in assessing complex reports. Regression and structural analysis suggest that these mistakes could be driven by receivers who are naive about the strategic use of complexity or overconfident about their ability to process complex information.
-
-
Copy CitationGinger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca, and Daniel J. Martin, "Complex Disclosure," NBER Working Paper 24675 (2018), https://doi.org/10.3386/w24675.Download Citation
-
Published Versions
Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2022. "Complex Disclosure," Management Science, vol 68(5), pages 3236-3261. citation courtesy of 
More from the NBER
In addition to working papers, the NBER disseminates affiliates’ latest findings through a range of free periodicals — the NBER Reporter, the NBER Digest, the Bulletin on Health, and the Bulletin on Entrepreneurship — as well as online conference reports, video lectures, and interviews.
