Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision
Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent’s preferred scope shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent’s degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over project scopes. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.
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Copy CitationT. Renee Bowen, George Georgiadis, and Nicolas S. Lambert, "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision," NBER Working Paper 22772 (2016), https://doi.org/10.3386/w22772.Download Citation
Published Versions
T. Renee Bowen & George Georgiadis & Nicolas S. Lambert, 2019. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol 11(1), pages 243-298. citation courtesy of 
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