NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Renee Bowen

University of California at San Diego
RBC #1420
9500 Gilman Dr. #0519
La Jolla , California 92093-0519

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NBER Program Affiliations: POL
NBER Affiliation: Faculty Research Fellow

NBER Working Papers and Publications

November 2016Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations
with David P. Baron, Salvatore Nunnari: w22821
We present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions – coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next. We study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period. Our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is made and comes to a vote. We compare committees with no communication, committees where communication is public and messages are observed by all committee members, and committees where communication is private and any committee member can send private messages to any other committee member. We find that the opportunity to communicate has a signif...

Published: David P. Baron & Renee Bowen & Salvatore Nunnari, 2017. "Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations," Journal of Public Economics, .

October 2016Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision
with George Georgiadis, Nicolas S. Lambert: w22772
Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent’s preferred scope shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent’s degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over project scopes. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.
July 2016Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions
with Ying Chen, Hülya K. Eraslan, Jan Zápal: w22457
Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an endogenous status quo, whereas discretionary spending is a periodic appropriation that is not allocated if no new agreement is reached. We show that discretionary only and mandatory only institutions typically lead to dynamic inefficiency and that mandatory only institutions can even lead to static in...

Published: Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya & Zápal, Jan, 2017. "Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 148-176. citation courtesy of

 
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