The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match

We thank Neil Dorosin, Jesse Margolis, Sonali Murarka, and Elizabeth Sciabarra for their expertise and for facilitating access to the data used in this study. Special thanks to Alvin E. Roth for his collaboration, which made this study possible. Jesse Margolis provided extremely helpful comments. We also thank Josh Angrist, Steve Berry, Stefan Bonhomme, Eric Budish, Francesco Decarolis, Matt Gentzkow, Arda Gitmez, Jerry Hausman, Phil Haile, Ali Hortacsu, Peter Hull, Yusuke Narita, Derek Neal, Alex Olssen, Ariel Pakes, Amy Ellen Schwartz, Jesse Shapiro, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, Federal Reserve Bank of NY, London School of Economics, Yale University, and the NBER Market Design conference for input. We received excellent research assistance from Alonso Bucarey, Red Davis, Weiwei Hu, Danielle Wedde, and a hard-working team of MIT undergraduates. Agarwal acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation (grant SES- 1427231). Pathak acknowledges support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (grant BR2012-068), National Science Foundation (grant SES-1056325), and the William T. Grant Foundation. Abdulkadiroglu and Pathak are on the Scientific Advisory Board of the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice. The authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research in this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

• Online appendix

• March 27, 2015
• October 27, 2015
• November 22, 2016