Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Jonathan Levin, Andrzej Skrzypacz

NBER Working Paper No. 20487
Issued in September 2014
NBER Program(s):   IO

The combinatorial clock auction is becoming increasingly popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction and predation. These outcomes arise because of the way the auction separates allocation and pricing, so that bidders are asked to make decisions that cannot possibly affect their own auction outcome. Our results obtain in a standard homogenous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.

Supplementary materials for this paper:

• Online Appendix

Acknowledgments and Disclosures

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w20487

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these: