Andrzej Skrzypacz

Stanford University
Graduate School of Business
Stanford, CA 94305-5015

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org

NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2014Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
with Jonathan Levin: w20487
The combinatorial clock auction is becoming increasingly popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction and predation. These outcomes arise because of the way the auction separates allocation and pricing, so that bidders are asked to make decisions that cannot possibly affect their own auction outcome. Our results obtain in a standard homogenous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.
November 2004Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design
with Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer: w10891
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold. Such auctions are commonly used, both formally and informally. In formal auctions, the seller restricts bids to an ordered set, such as an equity share or royalty rate, and commits to a format, such as first or second-price. In informal settings with competing buyers, the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront. Rather, bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid, based on his beliefs, ex-post. We characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies for formal and informal auctions. For formal auctions, we examine the impact of both the security design and the auction format. We define a notion...

Published: DeMarzo, Peter M., Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz. "Bidding With Securities: Auctions And Security Design," American Economic Review, 2005, v95(4,Sep), 936-959. citation courtesy of

NBER Videos

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email:

Contact Us