Loose Knots: Strong versus Weak Commitments to Save for Education in Uganda
Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error =0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.
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Copy CitationDean Karlan and Leigh L. Linden, "Loose Knots: Strong versus Weak Commitments to Save for Education in Uganda," NBER Working Paper 19863 (2014), https://doi.org/10.3386/w19863.
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