Debt Fragility and Bailouts
NBER Working Paper No. 18377
This paper studies debt fragility and the sharing of the resulting strategic uncertainty through ex post bailouts. Default arises in equilibrium because of both fundamental shocks and beliefs. The probability of default depends on borrowing rates and, in equilibrium, on the beliefs of lenders about this probability. This interaction creates a strategic complementarity and thus the basis for strategic uncertainty. The paper analyzes the role of credible ex post bailouts as a means of sharing both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. While bailouts may occur in some states, debt fragility remains.
You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery.
This paper was revised on March 31, 2015
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w18377
Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these: