Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy and Training
NBER Working Paper No. 17912
---- Acknowledgements -----
We thank Clément Imbert, Selvan Kumar, Dhruva Kothari, Neil Buddy Shah, and Pankaj Verma for their outstanding contributions as research assistants on this project. We are indebted to M.K. Devarajan, and M. L. Lather for their insights and comments, and A.S. Gill, formerly Director General of Police for Rajasthan Police, for initiating and constantly supporting this research. Previously circulated as "Can Institutions be Reformed from Within? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment with the Rajasthan Police." The findings and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not in any way engage the responsibility of the Rajasthan Police. The paper was written in complete independence and the Rajasthan Police, as an institution, did not weigh in on the analysis of the data or the drafting of the report. All the data collected in the course of this project is available for download and public use (including, but not limited to, replication of our results) at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jpal. We are grateful for funding from the Will and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the UNODC. The Hewlett Foundation was not involved in the drafting of this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.