TY  - JOUR
AU  - Chong,Alberto
AU  - O,Ana L. De La
AU  - Karlan,Dean
AU  - Wantchekon,Leonard
TI  - Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 17679
PY  - 2011
Y2  - December 2011
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17679
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17679.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto Chong
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario
K1N-6N5
Canada
E-Mail: achong@uottawa.ca

Ana L. De La O
Yale University
177 Prospect Street
New Haven, CT 06520
E-Mail: ana.delao@yale.edu

Dean Karlan
Department of Economics
Yale University
P.O. Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8629
Tel: 203/432-4479
Fax: 203/432-5591
E-Mail: dean.karlan@yale.edu

Leonard Wantchekon
Princeton University
E-Mail: lwantche@princeton.edu
AB  - Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identification with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond to information by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional contexts that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability.
ER  -