NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Ana L. De La O

Yale University
177 Prospect Street
New Haven, CT 06520

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

December 2011Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes
with Alberto Chong, Dean Karlan, Leonard Wantchekon: w17679
Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identification with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to...
 
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