Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
NBER Working Paper No. 17647
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Previously circulated as "Incentives and Adaptation: Evidence from Highway Procurement in Minnesota." We are grateful to the Minnesota Department of Transportation for data, and to Rabinder Bains, Tom Ravn and Gus Wagner for their help. We would also like to thank John Asker, Susan Athey, Raj Chetty, Matt Gentzkow, Oliver Hart, Ken Hendricks, Jon Levin, Justin Marion, Ariel Pakes, Chad Syverson and participants at Harvard, LSE, MIT, Toronto, UC Davis and Wisconsin and the AEA, CAPCP, IIOC, Stony Brook, UBC IO, WBEC and the NBER IO / Market Design / PE conferences. Lou Argentieri, Jason Kriss, Zhenyu Lai, Tina Marsh, Maryam Saeedi, Connan Snider and Danyang Su provided excellent research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge support from the NSF (grant no. SES-0924371). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.