NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Tipping Climate Negotiations

Geoffrey Heal, Howard Kunreuther

NBER Working Paper No. 16954
Issued in April 2011
NBER Program(s):   EEE

Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.

download in pdf format
   (189 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (189 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w16954

Published: “Tipping Climate Negotiations” (with Geoffrey Heal). In: Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling. R. Hahn and A. Ulph (eds.) Oxford University Press (2012).

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Burstein and Melitz w16960 Trade Liberalization and Firm Dynamics
Kunreuther, Heal, Allen, Edenhofer, Field, and Yohe w18607 Risk Management and Climate Change
Heal w15081 The Economics of Renewable Energy
Heal w17008 Sustainability and its Measurement
Hall and Helmers w16920 Innovation and Diffusion of Clean/Green Technology: Can Patent Commons Help?
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us