NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools

Roland G. Fryer

NBER Working Paper No. 16850
Issued in March 2011
NBER Program(s):   ED   LS

Financial incentives for teachers to increase student performance is an increasingly popular education policy around the world. This paper describes a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement. I find no evidence that teacher incentives increase student performance, attendance, or graduation, nor do I find any evidence that the incentives change student or teacher behavior. If anything, teacher incentives may decrease student achievement, especially in larger schools. The paper concludes with a speculative discussion of theories that may explain these stark results.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w16850

Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City,” 2008 [forthcoming in Journal of Labor Economics]

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