Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools
Financial incentives for teachers to increase student performance is an increasingly popular education policy around the world. This paper describes a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement. I find no evidence that teacher incentives increase student performance, attendance, or graduation, nor do I find any evidence that the incentives change student or teacher behavior. If anything, teacher incentives may decrease student achievement, especially in larger schools. The paper concludes with a speculative discussion of theories that may explain these stark results.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w16850
Published: Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools Roland G. Fryer Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 2013), pp. 373-407 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Society of Labor Economists and the NORC at the University of Chicago
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