TY  - JOUR
AU  - Babcock,Philip
AU  - Bedard,Kelly
AU  - Charness,Gary
AU  - Hartman,John
AU  - Royer,Heather
TI  - Letting Down the Team? Evidence of Social Effects of Team Incentives
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 16687
PY  - 2011
Y2  - January 2011
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16687
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16687.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Philip S. Babcock
Department of Economics
2036 North Hall
University of California, Santa Barbara
Mail Code 9210
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
Tel: 805/893-4823
Fax: 805/893-8830
E-Mail: babcock@econ.ucsb.edu

Kelly Bedard
UCSB
E-Mail: kelly@econ.ucsb.edu

Gary Charness
UC, Santa Barbara
E-Mail: charness@econ.ucsb.edu

John L. Hartman
Department of Economics
2028 North Hall
University of California, Santa Barbara
Mail Code 9210
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
E-Mail: hartman@econ.ucsb.edu

Heather Royer
Department of Economics
University of California, Santa Barbara
2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
Tel: 805/893-3797
Fax: 805/893-8830
E-Mail: royer@econ.ucsb.edu
AB  - This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In two field experiments featuring exogenous team formation and opportunities for repeated social interactions, we find large team effects that operate through social channels. The team compensation system induced agents to choose effort as if they valued a marginal dollar of compensation for their teammate from two-thirds as much (in one study) to twice as much as they valued a dollar of their own compensation (in the other study). We conclude that social effects of monetary team incentives exist and can induce effort at lower cost than through direct individual payment.
ER  -