TY  - JOUR
AU  - Coles,Peter
AU  - Kushnir,Alexey
AU  - Niederle,Muriel
TI  - Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 16185
PY  - 2010
Y2  - July 2010
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16185
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16185.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Peter Coles
Harvard University
E-Mail: pcoles@hbs.edu

Alexey Kushnir
Department of Economics
The Pennsylvania State University
E-Mail: alexey.kushnir@gmail.com

Muriel Niederle
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel: 650/723-7359
Fax: 650/725-5702
E-Mail: niederle@stanford.edu
AB  - Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets.
ER  -