NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game

Nicole M. Baran, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales

NBER Working Paper No. 15654
Issued in January 2010
NBER Program(s):   EEE   IO   PE

We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

download in pdf format
   (347 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w15654

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Johnson and Walsh w14793 The Effect of Property Taxes on Location Decisions:Evidence From the Market for Vacation Homes
Horioka w14639 Do Bequests Increase or Decrease Wealth Inequalities?
Cunha and Heckman w14695 The Economics and Psychology of Inequality and Human Development
Metcalf w14375 Designing A Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Alfaro and Kanczuk w13131 Nominal versus Indexed Debt: A Quantitative Horse Race
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us