NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game

Nicole M. Baran, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales

NBER Working Paper No. 15654
Issued in January 2010
NBER Program(s):   EEE   IO   PE

We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

download in pdf format
   (347 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (347 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w15654

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales w13387 Understanding Trust
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales w15845 Civic Capital as the Missing Link
Jacob w15655 The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Evidence from Public Schooling
Berman, Shapiro, and Felter w14606 Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Metcalf w14375 Designing A Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us