NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Distribution of Prizes in a Match-Play Tournament with Single Eliminations

Sherwin Rosen

NBER Working Paper No. 1516
Issued in December 1984
NBER Program(s):   LS

This paper begins to study the reward-incentive structure in sequential knock-out or elimination tournaments with matched, pairwise comparisons among players at each stage. The prize structure required to elicit constant expected quality of play in all matches throughout the tournament is characterized for competition among equally talented (or perfectly handicapped), players.The incentive maintaining prize structure is shown to concentrate' extra weight on the top ranking prize, a phenomenon observed in most tournaments. More can be said. Prizes that maintain performance incentives at all stages award a constant increment for each match won up to the last stage; and an amount greater than this for the player who wins the final match. Players' incentives to perform in early rounds are propelled by the probability of achieving higher ranks and surviving to later stages where rewards are larger. These continuation options are played out in the final match, so it is only the difference between winning and losing prizes in the finals that controls incentives there. Many athletic tournaments are structured in the manner analyzed here,but the general framework ultimately may have application to certain career games as well. More generally, a tournament structure may he viewed as a statistical, experimental design problem.The prize structure interacts with the design in providing incentives for the best players to survive to the finals and win the top prizes.

download in pdf format
   (493 K)

download in djvu format
   (249 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (493 K) or DjVu (249 K) (Download viewer) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w1516

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Rosen w1668 Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments
Lazear and Rosen w0401 Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us