NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility

Veronica Guerrieri, Péter Kondor

NBER Working Paper No. 14898
Issued in April 2009
NBER Program(s):   AP   EFG   CF

We propose a model where investors hire fund managers to invest either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some managers have superior information on the default probability. Looking at the past performance, investors update beliefs on their managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns which affect investment decisions, generating a positive or negative "reputational premium". For example, when the default probability is high, uninformed managers prefer to invest in riskless assets to reduce the probability of being fired. As the economic and financial conditions change, the reputational premium amplifies the reaction of prices and capital flows.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14898

Published: Veronica Guerrieri & Peter Kondor, 2012. "Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1986-2017, August. citation courtesy of

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