Peter Kondor

London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
Houghton Street

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org

NBER Working Papers and Publications

February 2014Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics of Arbitrage Capital
with Dimitri Vayanos: w19931
We develop a dynamic model of liquidity provision, in which hedgers can trade multiple risky assets with arbitrageurs. We compute the equilibrium in closed form when arbitrageurs' utility over consumption is logarithmic or risk-neutral with a non-negativity constraint. Liquidity is increasing in arbitrageur wealth, while asset volatilities, correlations, and expected returns are hump-shaped. Liquidity is a priced risk factor: assets that suffer the most when liquidity decreases, e.g., those with volatile cashflows or in high supply by hedgers, offer the highest expected returns. When hedging needs are strong, arbitrageurs can choose to provide less liquidity even though liquidity provision is more profitable.
July 2012Inefficient Investment Waves
with Zhiguo He: w18217
We develop a dynamic model of trading and investment with limited aggregate resources to study investment cycles. Unverifiable idiosyncratic investment opportunities imply market prices to play a role of rent distribution, distorting private investment incentives from a social point of view. This distortion is price-dependent, leading to two-sided inefficient investment cycles--too much investment in booms with high prices and too little in recessions with low prices. Interventions targeting only the underinvestment in recessions might make all agents worse off. We connect our results to both industry specific and aggregate boom-and-bust patterns.

Published: Zhiguo He & P├ęter Kondor, 2016. "Inefficient Investment Waves," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 735-780, 03. citation courtesy of

April 2009Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility
with Veronica Guerrieri: w14898
We propose a model where investors hire fund managers to invest either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some managers have superior information on the default probability. Looking at the past performance, investors update beliefs on their managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns which affect investment decisions, generating a positive or negative "reputational premium". For example, when the default probability is high, uninformed managers prefer to invest in riskless assets to reduce the probability of being fired. As the economic and financial conditions change, the reputational premium amplifies the reaction of prices and capital flows.

Published: Veronica Guerrieri & Peter Kondor, 2012. "Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1986-2017, August. citation courtesy of

NBER Videos

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email:

Contact Us