TY  - JOUR
AU  - Djankov,Simeon
AU  - Porta,Rafael La
AU  - Lopez-de-Silanes,Florencio
AU  - Shleifer,Andrei
TI  - Disclosure by Politicians
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14703
PY  - 2009
Y2  - February 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14703
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14703.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Simeon Djankov
min
E-Mail: sdjankov@minfin.bg

Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College
Tuck School
210 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH  03755
Tel: 603/646-3739
E-Mail: rafael.laporta@dartmouth.edu

Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
EDHEC Business School
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
06202 Nice Cedex 3
France
Tel: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07
Fax: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41
E-Mail: Florencio.lopezdesilanes@edhec.edu

Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu
AB  - We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries.  Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries.  Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
ER  -