Disclosure by Politicians

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer

NBER Working Paper No. 14703
Issued in February 2009
NBER Program(s):   LE   POL

We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.

(616 K)

Published: Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2010. "Disclosure by Politicians," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 179-209, April.

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