TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fox,Jeremy T.
TI  - Estimating Matching Games with Transfers
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14382
PY  - 2008
Y2  - October 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14382
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14382.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Jeremy T. Fox
Economics Department
University of Michigan
238 Lorch Hall
611 Tappan Ave
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
Tel: 734-330-2854
Fax: 734-274-2331
E-Mail: jeremyfox@gmail.com
AB  - Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sorting. I show how to use equilibrium data on who matches with whom for semiparametric estimation of match production functions in many-to-many, two-sided matching games with transferable utility. Inequalities derived from equilibrium necessary conditions underlie a maximum score estimator of match production functions. The inequalities do not require data on transfers, quotas, production levels, or unmatched agents. The estimator does not suffer from a computational or data curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market, as the estimator avoids solving for an equilibrium and estimating first-stage match probabilities. I present an empirical application to automotive suppliers and assemblers.
ER  -