@techreport{NBERw14382,
 title = "Estimating Matching Games with Transfers",
 author = "Jeremy T. Fox",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "14382",
 year = "2008",
 month = "October",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w14382",
 abstract = {Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sorting. I show how to use equilibrium data on who matches with whom for semiparametric estimation of match production functions in many-to-many, two-sided matching games with transferable utility. Inequalities derived from equilibrium necessary conditions underlie a maximum score estimator of match production functions. The inequalities do not require data on transfers, quotas, production levels, or unmatched agents. The estimator does not suffer from a computational or data curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market, as the estimator avoids solving for an equilibrium and estimating first-stage match probabilities. I present an empirical application to automotive suppliers and assemblers.},
}