TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ostrovsky,Michael
AU  - Schwarz,Michael
TI  - Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 13766
PY  - 2008
Y2  - January 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13766
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13766.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Michael Ostrovsky
Stanford Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: (650)724-7280
E-Mail: ostrovsky@gsb.stanford.edu

Michael Schwarz
Yahoo! Research
2397 Shattuck Ave
Berkeley, CA 94704
Fax: 510/704-2401
E-Mail: no email available
AB  - This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.
ER  -