Michael Ostrovsky

Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: 650/724-7280

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NBER Program Affiliations: IO
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate

NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2014Strategic Trading in Informationally Complex Environments
with Nicolas S. Lambert, Mikhail Panov: w20516
We study trading behavior and the properties of prices in informationally complex markets. Our model is based on the single-period version of the linear-normal framework of Kyle (1985). We allow for essentially arbitrary correlations among the random variables involved in the model: the value of the traded asset, the signals of strategic traders and competitive market makers, and the demand from liquidity traders. We show that there always exists a unique linear equilibrium, characterize it analytically, and illustrate its properties in a series of examples. We then use this characterization to study the informational efficiency of prices as the number of strategic traders becomes large. If liquidity demand is positively correlated (or uncorrelated) with the asset value, then prices in lar...
January 2008Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets
with Michael Schwarz: w13766
This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.

Published: Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2010. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 34-63, May. citation courtesy of

November 2005Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
with Benjamin Edelman, Michael Schwarz: w11765
We investigate the "generalized second price" auction (GSP), a new mechanism which is used by search engines to sell online advertising that most Internet users encounter daily. GSP is tailored to its unique environment, and neither the mechanism nor the environment have previously been studied in the mechanism design literature. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. In particular, unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP in a dynamic environment, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to the GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium...

Published: Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March. citation courtesy of

May 2004Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples)
with Ariel Pakes, Steve Berry: w10506
This paper considers the problem of estimating the distribution of payoffs in a discrete dynamic game, focusing on models where the goal is to learn about the distribution of firms' entry and exit costs. The idea is to begin with non parametric first stage estimates of entry and continuation values obtained by computing sample averages of the realized continuation values of entrants who do enter and incumbents who do continue. Under certain assumptions these values are linear functions of the parameters of the problem, and hence are not computationally burdensome to use. Attention is given to the small sample problem of estimation error in the non parametric estimates and this leads to a preference for use of particularly simple estimates of continuation values and moments.

Published: Pakes, Ariel, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steven Berry. “Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games, with Entry/Exit Examples.” RAND Journal of Economics 38, 2 (Summer 2007): 373-399. citation courtesy of

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