TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bajari,Patrick
AU  - Hong,Han
AU  - Khwaja,Ahmed
TI  - Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 12445
PY  - 2006
Y2  - August 2006
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12445
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12445.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Patrick Bajari
Professor of Economics
University of Minnesota
4-101 Hanson Hall
1925 4th Street South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Tel: 612/625-8369
Fax: 612/624-0209
E-Mail: bajari@econ.umn.edu

Han Hong
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
E-Mail: doubleh@stanford.edu

Ahmed Khwaja
Yale School of Management
135 Prospect St
New Haven, CT 06520
E-Mail: ahmed.khwaja@yale.edu
AB  - Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. Using a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy we find significant evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection.
ER  -