Cambridge Judge Business School
University of Cambridge
Cambridge CB2 1AG
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|October 2006||Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions|
with Dan Silverman, Frank Sloan: w12615
This study examines the relationship between time discounting, other sources of time preference, and intertemporal choices about smoking. Using a survey fielded for our analysis, we elicit rates of time discount from choices in financial and health domains. We also examine the relationship between other determinants of time preference and smoking status. We find very high rates of time discount in the financial realm for a horizon of one year, irrespective of smoking status. In the health domain, the implied rates of time discount decline with the length of the time delay (hyperbolic discounting) and the sign of the payoff (the "sign effect"). We use a series of questions about the willingness to undergo a colonoscopy to elicit short- and long-run rates of discount in a quasi-hyperbolic di...
Published: Khwaja, Ahmed & Silverman, Dan & Sloan, Frank, 2007. "Time preference, time discounting, and smoking decisions," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 927-949, September. citation courtesy of
|August 2006||Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis|
with Patrick Bajari, Han Hong: w12445
Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. Using a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy we find significant evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection.
Published: Patrick Bajari & Christina Dalton & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2014. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis," The RAND Journal of Economics, vol 45(4), pages 747-763.