NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Belief Flipping in a Dynamic Model of Statistical Discrimination

Roland G. Fryer, Jr.

NBER Working Paper No. 12174
Issued in April 2006
NBER Program(s):   LS

The literature on statistical discrimination shows that ex-ante identical groups may be differentially treated in discriminatory equilibria. This paper constructs a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and explores what happens to the individuals who nonetheless overcome the initial discrimination. If an employer discriminates against a group of workers in her initial hiring, she may actually favor the successful members of that group when she promotes from within the firm. The worker's welfare implications (i.e. who benefits from an employer's discriminatory hiring practices) are unclear. Even though agents face discrimination initially, some may be better off because of it.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w12174

Published: Fryer, Ronald G. Jr. "Belief flipping in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination." Journal of Public Economics 91, 5-6 (June 2007): 1151-1166.

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