TY  - JOUR
AU  - Iaryczower,Matias
AU  - Spiller,Pablo
AU  - Tommasi,Mariano
TI  - Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11317
PY  - 2005
Y2  - May 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11317
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11317.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Matias Iaryczower
037 Corwin Hall
Department of Politics
Princeton University
08544, Princeton, NJ
Tel: 6266165218
E-Mail: miaryc@princeton.edu

Pablo T. Spiller
University of California
Walter A. Haas School of Business
Faculty Bldg. 593
Berkeley, CA 94720
Tel: 510/642-1502
Fax: 510/642-2826
E-Mail: spiller@haas.berkeley.edu

Mariano Tommasi
Lynch 664
University De San Andres
San Isidro, 1642 Buenos Aires 3731
ARGENTINA
Tel: fax 541-746-5090
E-Mail: tamara@udesa.edu.ar
AB  - This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.
ER  -