University De San Andres
San Isidro, 1642 Buenos Aires 3731
Tel: fax 541-746-5090
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2005||Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation|
with Matias Iaryczower, Pablo Spiller: w11317
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.
Published: Iaryczower, Matias, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation." American Political Science Review 100, 1 (Feb 2006): 85-97.
|January 1999||Politics, Institutions, and Public-Sector Spending in the Argentine Provinces|
with Mark P. Jones, Pablo Sanguinetti
in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen, editors