TY  - JOUR
AU  - Lazear,Edward P.
TI  - Incentive Effects of Pensions
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 1126
PY  - 1983
Y2  - May 1983
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1126
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1126.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Edward P. Lazear
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: 650/723-9136
Fax: 650/723-0498
E-Mail: lazear@stanford.edu
M1  - published as Edward P. Lazear. "Incentive Effects of Pensions," in David A. Wise, ed., "Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice" University of Chicago Press (1985)

AB  - Many different types of pension plans exist in American firms. The stipulations of plans vary dramatically, even among large firms, with respect to vesting, relationship of the pension to final salary, maximum and minimum years of service constraints, and maximum and minimum benefit levels. These provisions are examined to determine their effects on worker behavior.Specifically, the paper analyes which plans encourage or discourage appropriate worker responses in hours worked, turnover, human capital investment and effort. An attempt is made to explain the provisions in light of the findings.
ER  -