Incentive Effects of Pensions
 (377 K)
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NBER Working Paper No. 1126
Issued in May 1983
NBER Program(s): PE LS
Many different types of pension plans exist in American firms. The stipulations of plans vary dramatically, even among large firms, with respect to vesting, relationship of the pension to final salary, maximum and minimum years of service constraints, and maximum and minimum benefit levels. These provisions are examined to determine their effects on worker behavior.Specifically, the paper analyes which plans encourage or discourage appropriate worker responses in hours worked, turnover, human capital investment and effort. An attempt is made to explain the provisions in light of the findings.
Published:
- Lazear, Edward P. "Incentive Effects of Pensions." Pension, Labor, and Individual Choice, edited by David A. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1985), pp. 253-282.
,
- Incentive Effects of Pensions, Edward P. Lazear, in Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice (1985), University of Chicago Press
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