@techreport{NBERw10104,
 title = "Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All Markets",
 author = "Roland G. Fryer and Glenn C. Loury",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "10104",
 year = "2003",
 month = "November",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w10104",
 abstract = {This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals; and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category. Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the redistribution goal.},
}