NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All Markets

Roland G. Fryer, Glenn C. Loury

NBER Working Paper No. 10104
Issued in November 2003
NBER Program(s):   LS

This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals; and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category. Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the redistribution goal.

download in pdf format
   (506 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (506 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w10104

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Smith and Fryer w9904 The Economics of 'Acting White'
Fryer and Loury w11464 Affirmative Action and Its Mythology
Fryer, Loury, and Yuret w10103 Color-Blind Affirmative Action
Fryer w12364 A Model of Social Interactions and Endogenous Poverty Traps
Fryer and Levitt w9938 The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us