How European Markets Became Free: A Study of Institutional Drift
Over the past twenty years, Europe has deregulated many industries, protected consumer welfare, and created strongly independent regulators. These policies represent a stark departure from historical traditions in continental Europe. How and why did this turnaround happen? We build a political economy model of market regulation and we compare the design of national and supra-national regulators. We show that countries in a single market willingly promote a supranational regulator that enforces free markets beyond the preferences of any individual country. We test and confirm the predictions of the model. European institutions are indeed more independent and enforce competition more strongly than any individual country ever did. Countries with ex-ante weaker institutions benefit more from the delegation of competition policy to the EU level.
-
-
Copy CitationGermán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon, "How European Markets Became Free: A Study of Institutional Drift," NBER Working Paper 24700 (2018), https://doi.org/10.3386/w24700.Download Citation
-
Non-Technical Summaries
- Since 2000, gross profit rates in the United States have risen and industry concentration has soared, but these trends are not found...
Published Versions
German Gutierrez & Thomas Philippon, 2023. "How European Markets Became Free: A Study of Institutional Drift," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol 21(1), pages 251-292.
More from the NBER
In addition to working papers, the NBER disseminates affiliates’ latest findings through a range of free periodicals—the NBER Reporter, the NBER Digest, the Bulletin on Health, the Bulletin on the Economics of Alzheimer's, and the Bulletin on Entrepreneurship—as well as research spotlights, lectures, and panel videos.
