NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union

Mark Hallerberg, Jürgen von Hagen

Chapter in NBER book Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance (1999), James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen, editors (p. 209 - 232)
Published in January 1999 by University of Chicago Press
© 1999 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

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This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w6341, Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union, Mark Hallerberg, Jurgen von Hagen
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Hallerberg and von Hagen w6341 Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union
 
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